Excludability of Quarters Allowance from Gross Income for Tax Purposes by Blumberg, Herbert
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 8 Number 2 Article 8 
1-1-1959 
Excludability of Quarters Allowance from Gross Income for Tax 
Purposes 
Herbert Blumberg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Herbert Blumberg, Excludability of Quarters Allowance from Gross Income for Tax Purposes, 8 Buff. L. 
Rev. 281 (1959). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol8/iss2/8 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ 
University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized 
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS
in addition to the jurisdictions adopting the negligence rule,a3 more than thirty
states have adopted statutes which in one way or another give protection to the
radio stations. Some states have adopted a "due care" provision into their de-
famation-by-radio statutes3 4 while others simply grant immunity to radio stations
in regard to broadcasts made under section 315.35 By either of these methods, the
problem of the scope of section 315, at least as to liability, is obviated.
David C. F'iding
Excludability of Quarters Allowance From Gross Income for Tax Purposes
The taxpayer, a doctor employed by the Veteran's Adminstration, occupied
quarters on hospital grounds owned by his employer. He was required, as a
condition of his employment, and in order to perform his duties, to live on the
grounds. Under authority of V. A. manuals, rental charges for the quarters oc-
cupied by the taxpayer were withheld from his official basic salary before he re-
ceived it. Thus, instead of his full official salary, the taxpayer received an amount
representing the difference between the official salary and the rental value of
the premises. Under V. A. Regulations, the rental charges were considered part
of taxpayer's compensation, and the V. A. was to be reimbursed for the cost of
furnishing quarters to employees by means of payroll deductions. In 1954 and
1955 the taxpayer also made direct rental payments for the use of a garage on
the hospital premises. On appeal from a Tax Court decision,' refusing to allow
33. E.g. New York (Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., suprra
note 6); Pennsylvania (Summit Hotel v. N.B.C. supra note 6), Connecticut(Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., supra note 12).
34. ARiz. REV. STATS. §12-652 (1952); CAL. Civ. CODE §48.5 (1949); COLO. STAT.
ANN. c. 138B §1 (supp. 1949); FLA. STAT. ANN. §770.04 (cum.supp. 1957); GA.
CODE ANN. §105-712 (cum. supp. 1957); IoWA CODE ANN. §659.5 (1949); KANS. LAws
1949 c. 320 §1;LA. REV. STAT. tit. 45 §1351 (1950); ME. LAws 1949 c. 134; MICH.
STAT. ANN. §27.1406 (1957 supp.); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§64-205-64-207 (1947)
requires malice in addition to the due care requirement; MINN. STATS. c. 544.043
(1957); Miss. AcTs 1954; NEB. REV. STAT. §§86-601-86-603 (1959 re-issue); NEv.
REV. STAT. §§41.340-41.360 (1957); N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §9915 (cum.supp. 1949);
OHIO REV. CODE §2739.03 (1953); ORE. REV. STAT. §30.150 (1957); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12 §1583 (1953); S.D. LAwS 1949 c. 206; TEx CIV. STAT. §5433a (1953 supp);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§45-2-5-45-2-10 (1953 supp.); VA. CODE ANN. §8-632.1 (1950);
WASH. REV. CODE §§19.64.010-19.64020 (1952), limited to ad libs and then only if
speaker is cut off the air immediately; W. VA. CODE §5482(1) (1955); Wyo. COMP.
STAT. §§3-8203-3-8204 (1957 cum.supp.).
35. ARK. STATS. §3-1606 (1954 supp.); IDAHO CODE §6-701 (1951 cum. supp.);
MD. LAwS, ART. 75, §19A (1952); Mo. ANN. STAT. §537-105 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12 § §1585, 1586 (1953); S.C. CODE OF LAWS §237 (1953 supp.). The same approach
is taken in the "due care" statutes of the following states: Arizona, California,
Colorado, Georgia, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Virginia and
Wyoming. See supra note 36. For a discussion of state legislation up to 1951,
see Remmer,, Recent Legislative Trends in Defamation by Radio,*64 HARV. L.R.
727 (1951), also published in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION, University
of Michigan Law School, Legislative Research Center, Ann Arbor, 1952.
1. 29 T.C. 813, CCH, Dec. 22, 829 (1958).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the exclusion of the rental value of the premises from the taxpayer's gross in-
come, a U. S. Court of Appeals, in Boykin v. Commirsioner,2 reversed the decision
insofar as it disallowed the exclusion of the value of the living quarters, and
affirmed the holding of the Tax Court that the garage rental payments were in-
cludiLle in gross income.
In determining his adjusted gross income for 1954 and 1955, Dr. Boykin
had excluded an amount representing the total rental charges for quarters and
garage. The Commissioner disallowed these exclusions on the groind that rental
payments were not made to the V. A. out of a cash allowance received specifically
for quarters. It was undisputed that the taxpayer was required as a condition of
his employment to live upon the employer's premises and that this served the
employer's convenience. The Commissioner took the position, however, that
satisfaction of these section 119(2)3 requirements did not automatically entitle
the taxpayer to the claimed exclusions, and that unless the additional require-
ments of Regulation 1.119-1(3) (2) were met, the exclusion could not be al-
lowed. The Tax Court, in accepting the Commissioner's position, held that since
the quarters were, in effect, rented with money received as compensation, the
amounts paid could not be excluded from gross income.
Before the 1954 Code, problems similar to the one presented in the instant
case were dealt with by regulations which supplemented the Code sections de-
fining gross income. In general, these regulations required that if a salary were
received as compensation, and in addition thereto living quarters or meals were
furnished, the value to the employee of the quarters or meals so furnished was
income subject to taxation. If, however, the quarters or meals were furnished for
the convenience of the employer, their value was not added to the compensation
otherwise received. Liberal though this provision appeared, the exclusion which
it allowed was restricted to a narrow range of cases all of which suggest that
once the compensatory nature of the lodging furnished was established, its value
constituted taxable income regardless of the convenience served. 4
In 1940 the potential liberality of the' Regulations was partially, but only
temporarily realized. Mim. 50235 ruled that if quarters were furnished to em-
ployees their value was includible in gross income as compensation. "If, however,
the quarters furnished are not compensatory or (emphasis added) are furnished
for the convenience of the employer, the value thereof need not be added to the
compensation otherwise received by the employee." The dear indication was that
2. Boykin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.-F.2d-CCH 1958 STAND.
FED. TAx REP.. (58-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 119900 (8th Cir. Oct. 30, 1958).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
4. Ralph Kitchen, 11 B.T.A. 855 (1928); Charles Frueauff 30 B.T.A. 449
(1934); Reynard Corp. 30 B.T.A. 451 (1934).
5. 1940-1 Cum. Bull. 14.
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even if lodging were furnished as compensation, its value would be excludable
if it were furnished for the convenience of the employer.
Any liberality fostered by Mim. 50236 was completely reversed in 1950 by
Mim. 64727. That communication was issued to clarify what the Commissioner
felt was a possible inconsistency in Regulation 29.22 (a) -3. It was said that the
"convenience of the employer" rule was to be construed so as to prevent violation
of the statutory definition of gross income. This was to be accomplished by ap-
plying the rule only in cases where it was not evident -from other circumstances
that the receipt of quarters represented compensation. Thus, where it appeared
from a statute or employment agreement that the lodging constituted compen-
sation, the convenience served was immaterial. As an illustration of the importance
to be placed on the general issue of compensation and the subordination of the
"convenience" rule, Mim. 6472 set out a fact situation substantially the same as
that of the present case, and arrived at the conclusion that the value of meals
and lodging was includible in gross income.
It has been suggested, and it would undoubtedly have been true in many
cases, that Mina. 6472 had no startling effect on the excludability of meals and
lodging furnished in kind.8 So long as the maintenance was not referred to as
compensation in the employment contract or in a statute, the compensatory na-
ture of the benefits would always be doubtful and the "convenience" rule would
be brought into play. In a case like the one under consideration, however, it is
clear that Mina. 6472 would have been determinative of the issue because under
the V. A. Regulations, in pursuance of which the employment contract was en-
tered, the rental value of the lodging was considered part of Dr. Boykin's com-
pensation.
It is important at" this point to mention a 1953 case which proved to have
great bearing upon the formulation of section 119 and therefore upon the out-
come of the Boykin case. In Diamond v. Stuf',9 the trial court held that main-
tenance received as compensation is always taxable regardless of the convenience
served. The taxpayer in that case was a doctor employed by a state hospital and
was required to live on the hospital premises in order to perform his duties.
Under section 41 of the New York Civil Service Law, which applied to the tax-
payer, maintenance was considered part of the employee's salary. the decision
of the Court was in strict compliance with Mim. 6472. Regulation 29.22(2)-3
could not be read so as to violate the definition of gross income contained in
section 22 (a) of the 1939 Code. The court felt that to allow the fact that the
6. Cf. Herman Martin, 44 B.T.A. 186 (1941) for a decision contra the position
announced in Mim. 2053.
7. 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 15.
8. N.Y.U. 11TH INST. ON FED. TAx 1147, 1152, 1153.
9. 116 F. Supp. 28 (N.D.N.Y. 1953).
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employer's convenience was served to affect the question of excludability would
be to overlook the compensatory nature of the maintenance and to exclude from
gross income an item specifically included by section 22 (a).
In 1955, on appeal to the Circuit Court, the decision was reversed.10 The
court said: "We hold that the 'convenience-of-the-employer test' as the measur-
ing-rod of compensation, having persisted through the interpretations of the
Treasury and the Tax Court throughout years of re-enactment of the Internal
Revenue Code, constituted the applicable standard .. .and that, since the food
and lodging received by [taxpayers] were clearly for the convnience of the
employer, they are not taxable as 'compensation'." This seems to be the first
judicial statement of the position apparently rejected by the Tax Court and
adopted by the Circuit Court in the Boykin case. Under that theory, it is impos-
sible to view the lodging as compensation to the employee once the fact of em-
ployer's convenience is established; what is convenience to the employer cannot.
at the same time, be compensatory to the employee.
It is interesting to note that the 1954 Code, with the new section 119 added.
became effective between the District Court decision in Diamond v. Stuf' and
the reversal of that decision by the Circuit Court. It is difficult to see how the
Circuit Court, faced as it was with Mim. 6472 and the cases which followed1 1
reached the conclusion it did wthout reference to section 119.
The legislative history of section 119 indicates that Congress was fully
aware of the District Court decision in Diamond v. Stuff and desired an op-
posite result under the new section. The House requirements for excludability
under the new section were that the meals or lodging be furnished at the place
of employment and that the employee be required to accept them as a condition
of his employment. If these criteria were met, the exclusion was to apply even
though the maintenance represented additional compensation to the employee.12
The Senate Finance Committee amended section 119 so as to make it clear that
the basic test of exclusion was to be whether the lodgings were furnished primarily.
for the convenience of the employer, regardless of their compensatory nature.13
The Senate also added the provision that in determining whether meals or lodging
were furnished for the employer's convenience, the terms of a state statute or an
employment contract should not be determinative of whether the meals or lodging
were intended as compensation.
In view of the obvious influence of the Diamond case, the Circuit Court in
10. Diamond v. Sturr, 221 Fed.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1955).
11. Joseph Doran, 21 T.C. 374 (1953); Joseph Brasher 22 T.C. 637 (1954).
12. U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. Naws, 83d Cong. 2d Sess., 1954, Vol. 3,
p. 4175.
13. Id. at 4825.
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Boykin was probably correct when it suggested that this provision was added be-
cause of the great weight given the New York statute by the District Court in
its Diamond decision. The suggestion 14 that it may be inferred from this provision
that the compensatory aspects of the maintenance still have some relevance to
the general issue of taxability, and that the compensation question is to be de-
termined by reference to some other circumstances, is not supported by the legis-
lative history or the Regulations to section 119. It is true that in reaching its
decision in the Boykin case, the Circuit Court found it necessary to hold that
Regulation 1.119-1 (c) (2) and the Regulation as a wh6le were inconsistent. The
first part of the Regulation requires that before the exclusion can be allowed,
the lodgings must be on the employer's business premises, they must be furnished
for the convenience of the employer, and the employee must be required to ac-
cept them as a condition of his employment. Rule 2 of sub-section c requires,
in addition, that the lodging be furnished in kind, without charge or cost to the
employee, and also that the employee not be obligated to reimburse the employer
for the lodging so furnished. If effect had been given to these (c) (2) require-
ments, it would have been necessary to ignore the exclusive emphasis placed on
"convenience" in the remainder of the Regulation and in the Code section itself.
The position of the Commissioner and the decision of the Tax Court to the
effect that it was possible for lodging to be furnished for the convenience of the
employer and still be compensation for Dr. Boykin's services and therefore in-
dudible in his gross income, was dearly correct under the law as it existed prior
to the 1954 Code. In the light of the legislative history of section 119, however,
it is equally clear that Congress intended a change in the results of cases arising
under the new section. The decision of the Circuit Court recognized and gave ef-
fect to the liberality intended.
Herbert Blumberg
14. Note, 53 MIcH. L. REv. 871 (1955).
